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Abstract
We introduce experimental persuasion between Sender and Receiver. Sender
chooses an experiment to perform from a feasible set of experiments. Receiver
observes the realization of this experiment and chooses an action. We charac-
terize optimal persuasion in this baseline regime and in an alternative regime in
which Sender can commit to garble the outcome of the experiment. Our model
includes Bayesian persuasion as the special case in which every experiment is
feasible; however, our analysis does not require concavification. Since we focus
on experiments rather than beliefs, we can accommodate general preferences
including costly experiments and non-Bayesian inference.
∗Department of Economics, MIT, ianball@mit.edu.
†Department of Economics, Yale University, jose-antonio.espin-sanchez@yale.edu.
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1 Introduction
In Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011, henceforth BP), Sender can
design any information structure for Receiver. An information structure is a Black-
well experiment, which specifies in each state a probability distribution over signal
realizations. Sender publicly selects one of these experiments and Nature draws the
realization. Receiver sees the realization, updates his beliefs about the state, and
then chooses an action. The interpretation of these experiments varies with the ap-
plication, but Sender must have access to all experiments. Otherwise, the elegant BP
analysis does not apply.
In many applications, however, the set of feasible experiments is institutionally
restricted. Pharmaceutical companies seeking FDA approval must follow standard
clinical trial protocols, though they do have flexibility in selecting the sample size,
allowing them to perform a “sample size samba” (Schulz and Grimes, 2005, p. 1351).
When schools select grading standards (Boleslavsky and Cotton, 2015; Ostrovsky and
Schwarz, 2010), they may choose among coarse letter grades and various numerical
systems, not arbitrary stochastic maps from performance to grades. Even in court—
the leading example in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)—the prosecutor is restricted:
only certain evidence is admissible, and each witness will be cross-examined by the
defense.
We introduce experimental persuasion (henceforth EP). Sender has access to a
feasible set of experiments and selects one experiment from this feasible set to perform.
Receiver observes the realization of this experiment and chooses an action. In our
model, the feasible set of experiments is a primitive that reflects institutional and
technological constraints.
With restricted experiments, Sender cannot induce every Bayes-plausible distribu-
tion of posteriors, so concavification (Aumann et al., 1995; Kamenica and Gentzkow,
2011) does not apply. We therefore focus directly on the space of experiments, rather
than the space of beliefs. Each experiment determines Receiver’s posterior beliefs and
hence his optimal actions, which generate Sender’s payoffs. Composing this sequence,
we obtain an indirect utility function over experiments. We believe this presentation
provides a new intuition for persuasion, particularly in the binary setting, where
we illustrate the solution by plotting the indifference curves of the indirect utility
function. Our approach also accommodates more general preferences such as costly
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experiments for Sender or non-Bayesian decision rules for Receiver.
We analyze two different regimes. In the first regime, Sender cannot garble the
outcome of the experiment. This regime is appropriate if the outcome of the exper-
iment is publicly observed. In this regime, the feasible set does not have a special
structure. We illustrate the solution graphically in examples and observe that Sender’s
preferences are not monotone with respect to Blackwell’s order. This setting reduces
to Bayesian persuasion if every experiment is feasible.
In the second regime, Sender can garble the outcome of the experiment. Re-
ceiver observes only the realization of the garbled experiment. This garbling regime
reduces to Bayesian persuasion if a perfectly revealing experiment is available, for
then Sender can garble the state arbitrarily. In the garbling regime, we first show
that Sender’s problem has a solution (Theorem 1). Then we establish properties
of the solution. Unlike in the no-garbling setting, Sender weakly prefers Blackwell
more-informative primitive experiments since they can always be garbled into less
informative experiments. Therefore, Sender can restrict attention to the subclass of
Blackwell undominated primitive experiments. If there are multiple undominated ex-
periments, then the set of synthetic experiments Sender can induce via garbling is not
convex (Theorem 2). Nevertheless, we show that optimal persuasion satisfies a form
of Kamenica and Gentzkow’s (2011) indifference result: optimal persuasion generally
makes Receiver indifferent between multiple actions (Theorem 3).
Bayesian persuasion has been extended in many different directions, as surveyed
in Kamenica (2019). These extensions generally retain the assumption that all ex-
periments are feasible. An exception is Haghtalab et al. (2021), in which Sender has
access to multiple noisy signals about the state and she can disclose exactly one of
these signals. Henry and Ottaviani (2019) show that observing a particular Brown-
ian motion until a stopping time can achieve the BP optimum in a binary setting.





Sender (she) and Receiver (he) have state-dependent preferences over the action cho-
sen by Receiver. The action space A and the state space Ω are both finite, with
typical elements a and ω, respectively. Payoffs are given by v(a, ω) for Sender and
u(a, ω) for Receiver.
Sender and Receiver share a common prior p over the state space Ω. Labeling
the states ω0, . . . , ωI−1, we can express the prior p as a vector (p0, . . . , pI−1). Neither
player observes the state realization. Sender can generate information about the state
by performing an experiment. Without loss, we restrict attention to experiments
that generate at most J signal realizations, where J ≥ max{|Ω|, |A|}; see footnote 3
for a discussion of this restriction. Signal realizations are denoted s0, . . . , sJ−1. An
experiment π is a stochastic I × J matrix,1 where πij is the probability that signal
sj is realized, given that the state is ωi. Let Π0 denote the set of all experiments.
Sender has access to a closed subset Π of Π0. She selects from the feasible set Π one
experiment to perform.
Receiver observes the realization of the experiment and then updates his beliefs.






Assume that Receiver breaks ties in Sender’s favor: if there are multiple actions in
a∗(q), Receiver chooses one that maximizes Sender’s utility. Denote this action by
â(q).2
2.2 Induced preferences over experiments
We now define Sender’s induced preferences over experiments. First we introduce
notation for Bayesian updating. Under experiment π, the ex ante probability of
1A matrix is stochastic if its entries are nonnegative and each row sums to 1.
2If there are multiple actions in a∗(q) that maximize Sender’s utility, then â(q) can be chosen
among them arbitrarily.
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Denote the full belief vector following realization sj by qj(π) = (qj0(π), . . . , q
j
I−1(π)).
The beliefs in (1) depend on the experiment π and also on the prior p, but our notation
suppresses the dependence on p when the prior is understood.






This expression is an expectation over realized state-signal pairs (ωi, sj). Sender’s
direct utility for each pair depends on the state ωi and Receiver’s chosen action
â(qj(π)). Receiver’s utility over experiments, U : Π0 → R, is defined analogously,
with u in place of v in (2).
While we focus directly on experiments, Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) focus on





Receiver’s posterior belief q determines his action â(q) and also pins down the condi-
tional distribution of the state (since Receiver’s beliefs are correct). By grouping the
summation in (2) by the signal realizations sj, we can express Sender’s experiment






Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) assume that Sender can perform any experiment.
Thus, Sender can induce every Bayes-plausible distribution over posteriors. Sender’s
optimal value, as a function of the prior, is given by the concavification of v̂—the
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smallest concave function larger than v̂. In our setting, Sender is restricted to per-
forming experiments in the feasible set Π, so she cannot necessarily induce every
Bayes-plausible distribution over posteriors. Hence, the concavification payoff is not
necessarily achievable.
2.3 Sender’s problem with and without garbling
We consider two different regimes. In the no-garbling regime, the timing is as fol-
lows. Sender selects one experiment π from the feasible set Π. Receiver observes the
realization of π, updates his beliefs, and chooses an action. In the garbling regime,
Sender commits upfront to the garbling that she will apply to her chosen experiment.
After nature draws the signal realization, Receiver observes only the garbled signal.
We now formally state Sender’s problem and we observe that a solution exists.
No garbling Sender performs one feasible experiment π from the set Π. Therefore,
Sender’s problem is
maximize V (π)
subject to π ∈ Π.
(3)
This problem reduces to standard Bayesian persuasion if every experiment is feasible,
i.e., Π = Π0.
With garbling Sender faces two choices: (i) which experiment to select, and (ii)
how to garble the chosen experiment. A garbling is a J × J stochastic matrix G. If
signal sj is realized in the chosen experiment, then the distribution of the garbled
signal is given by the j-th row of G.
Let  denote Blackwell’s (1951) informativeness order over experiments. For any
experiments π, π′ in Π0, we have π  π′ if and only if there exists a garbling matrix
G such that πG = π′. For any experiment π in Π0, the upper set ↑ π and lower set
↓ π are given by
↑ π = {ψ ∈ Π0 : ψ  π}, ↓ π = {ψ ∈ Π0 : ψ  π}.
If Sender chooses a primitive experiment π from Π, then garbling allows her to gen-
erate any synthetic experiment in the lower set ↓ π. Let ↓Π =
⋃
π∈Π ↓ π. This set
contains every experiment that is Blackwell dominated by some experiment in the
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feasible set Π. Sender’s problem is
maximize V (π)
subject to π ∈ ↓Π.
(4)
This setting reduces to Bayesian persuasion if ↓Π = Π0. This equality holds if and
only if the feasible set Π contains an experiment that fully reveals the state. In this
garbling regime, we are implicitly applying the revelation principle to the set ↓Π
rather than the set Π.3
Theorem 1 (Existence)
Each problem (3) and (4) has a solution.
The tie-breaking assumption ensures that V is upper semicontinuous. The space
Π0 of all experiments is compact. By assumption, Π is closed, and the proof amounts
to checking that ↓Π is closed as well. The details are in Appendix A.
3 Binary persuasion: A geometric approach
We illustrate our setting through Kamenica and Gentzkow’s (2011) leading binary
example of a prosecutor persuading a judge to convict a defendant. There are two
states: ω0 (innocent) and ω1 (guilty). Receiver (judge) has two actions: a0 (acquit)
and a1 (convict). Receiver gets utility 1 from the right decision and utility 0 from the
wrong decision. He convicts if he believes the defendant is more likely to be guilty
than innocent. Sender (prosecutor) wants the defendant to be convicted. She gets
utility 1 from conviction and 0 from acquittal, regardless of the state. The common
prior is that the defendant is guilty with probability 0.3. In this binary setting we
identify every belief with the probability of ω1 (guilty), so p = 0.3.
3 In the no-garbling regime, the restriction to experiments with at most |A| signal realizations is
without loss by the standard revelation principle. In the garbling regime, we apply the revelation
principle to the set ↓Π rather than the set Π. Consider any primitive set Π of experiments with
arbitrarily many signal realizations. This primitive set induces a set ↓Π of synthetic experiments,
also with arbitrarily many signal realizations. By the revelation principle, we can replace ↓Π with
a set of synthetic experiments rev ↓Π such that experiments in rev ↓Π each have at most |A| signal
realizations and the set of outcome distributions that Sender can induce is the same under ↓Π
and rev ↓Π. We must apply the revelation principle after including the garblings since it is not
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Figure 1. Top: Space of experiments (left) and induced beliefs (right). Bottom: Blackwell
upper and lower sets for experiment π (left) and induced beliefs (right).
3.1 Experiments and induced beliefs
There are two actions and two states, so we restrict attention to experiments with
J = 2 realizations. An experiment with two realizations, s0 and s1, is characterized by
the probability of realization s1 in each state. Denote by π0 and π1 the probabilities
of realization s1 in state ω0 and state ω1, respectively.4 Without loss, we assume
π1 ≥ π0; otherwise, swap the labels of the two signal realizations. In (π0, π1)-space,
the set of experiments is the subset of the unit square on or above the 45-degree line.
This region is shaded in the top left panel of Figure 1. In the language of simple
4In the notation of the general setting, the vector (π0, π1) is column π1 of the 2 × 2 stochastic
matrix π.
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hypothesis testing, if state ω0 is interpreted as the null hypothesis, state ω1 is the
alternative hypothesis, and signal s1 is rejecting the null, then the experiments are
parameterized by the significance level π0 = α and the power π1 = 1− β.
In this binary setting, Bayesian updating can be expressed cleanly in terms of the
likelihood ratio between state ω1 and ω0. The likelihood ratios after signal realizations

















Signal s1 is evidence weakly in favor of state ω1, while signal s0 is evidence weakly
against state ω1.
In Figure 1, the top left panel shows the set of experiments and the top right panel
shows the posteriors induced by a few highlighted experiments, for the fixed prior p =
0.3. In an experiment π, signal s1 is realized with ex ante probability pπ1 + (1− p)π0.
The two dashed lines are level curves of this expression. For experiments (π0, π1)
along any fixed line through the origin, the ratio π1/π0 is constant and equal to the
slope of the line.6
We highlight three lines in particular. The black line has slope 1. Experiments
along this line are uninformative and do not move Receiver’s belief away from the
prior p, as indicated in the bottom interval of the right panel. The blue line has slope
(1 − p)/p = 7/3. For any experiment along this line, signal realization s1 induces
posterior q = 0.5, denoted by the blue circle. On this line, the triangle (square)
experiment splits the prior between the posterior q = 0.5 and a posterior q below
p that is denoted by a blue triangle (square). The orange line is vertical. For any
experiment along this line, signal realization s1 induces posterior q = 1, denoted by
the orange circle.7 On this line, the triangle (square) experiment splits the prior
between the posterior q = 1 and a posterior q below p that is denoted by the orange
triangle (square).








for j = 0, 1.
6Similarly, along any line through the upper right endpoint (1, 1), the ratio (1− π1)/(1− π0) is
constant and equal to the inverse of the slope.
7Similarly, for experiments in the upper line (π1 = 1), the signal realization s0 indicates that the
state is ω0 with certainty.
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In Figure 1, the bottom panels illustrate the Blackwell order on the space of
experiments. The Blackwell order is independent of the prior p. For the indicated
experiment π, the upper set ↑ π is shaded orange and the lower set ↓ π is shaded blue.
Any experiment in the upper set can be garbled into π; any experiment in the lower
set is a garbling of π. The boundaries of the upper and lower sets are formed by two
lines—line L passing through (0, 0) and line R passing through (1, 1). For experiments
ψ above line L, signal s1 induces a stronger belief in state 1 under experiment ψ than
under π. For experiments ψ above line R, signal s0 induces a stronger belief in state
0 under experiment ψ than under π. Each experiment above both lines Blackwell
dominates π; each experiment below both lines is Blackwell dominated by π. The
experiments that lie above one line and below the other are not Blackwell comparable
with π.
The right panel shows the corresponding posterior splittings induced by the ex-
periments. The top line segment illustrates the splitting from a Blackwell dominating
experiment (orange square) and a Blackwell dominated experiment (blue triangle).
The middle line segment shows the splitting from the green diamond experiment,
and the bottom line segment shows the splitting from the pink pentagon experiment.
Both the green diamond and pink pentagon experiments lie on the curve in the left
panel, which traces out experiments that have the same mutual information with the
state as does experiment π.8
3.2 Preferences over experiments
Each experiment determines Receiver’s posterior beliefs, which in turn determine
Receiver’s actions, and hence the payoffs for Sender (and Receiver). By composing
these effects, we obtain Sender’s (and Receiver’s) indirect preferences over experi-
ments. From the likelihood ratios in (5), we see that under experiment π, signal






8For each experiment ψ along this curve, we have EH(q(π)) = EH(q(ψ)), were q(π) denotes
the random posterior that takes value qj(π) with probability q̄j(π), and H denotes the Shannon
entropy:
















Figure 2. Indifference curves over experiments for Sender (left) and Receiver (right)
Sender’s indirect utility function is
V (π) =
pπ1 + (1− p)π0 if π1p ≥ π0(1− p),0 otherwise.
Receiver’s indirect utility function is
U(π) =
pπ1 + (1− p)(1− π0) if π1p ≥ π0(1− p),1− p otherwise.
In general, these utility functions are piecewise linear, with each piece defined by the
vector of Receiver’s chosen actions,
(
â(q0(π)), . . . , â(qJ−1(π))
)
.
Figure 2 (left) plots the level curves of this function V , with prior p = 0.3. Below
the line with slope (1− p)/p = 7/3 is a thick indifference set, shaded in gray. Experi-
ments in this region do not change Receiver’s action. Above this line, Sender’s utility
V is linear. The indifference curves are parallel lines with slope −(1− p)/p = −7/3,
with utility increasing towards the northeast. Figure 2 (right) plots the level curves
of the function U , with prior p = 0.3. Again, there is a thick indifference set below
the line of slope 7/3. Above this line, indifference curves are parallel lines with utility
increasing towards the perfectly revealing experiment (0, 1).
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3.3 Optimality conditions
Recall that standard BP maximizes Sender’s utility V over the entire set of experi-
ments. In Figure 2 (left), we can immediately read off the BP optimum as the orange
point (p/(1− p), 1) = (3/7, 1). This experiment always recommends conviction if the
defendant is guilty and recommends conviction with probability p/(1 − p) = 3/7 if






+ p = 2p = 0.6.
The general expressions in terms of p remains correct for any p < 1/2.
In Figure 2 (left), we indicate in blue the two necessary conditions for optimality
from Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
1. Certainty condition. This condition states that Receiver is certain of the state
whenever he takes Sender’s worst action (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011, Propo-
sition 4). Experiments satisfying this condition lie on the horizontal blue line
defined by π1 = 1. If the certainty condition is violated, Sender can get strictly
higher payoffs by shifting the experiment upward, that is, recommending con-
viction slightly more often when the defendant is guilty. This increases the
probability of the conviction signal and makes Receiver more confident in the
defendant’s guilt upon seeing that signal.
2. Indifference condition. This condition states that Receiver is indifferent be-
tween multiple actions whenever he takes Sender’s preferred action (Kamenica
and Gentzkow, 2011, Proposition 5). Experiments satisfying this condition lie
on the blue line with slope 7/3. If this indifference condition is violated, Sender
can get strictly higher payoffs by shifting the experiment slightly to the right,
that is, recommending conviction slightly more often when the defendant is in-
nocent. This increases the probability of the conviction signal without changing
Receiver’s willingness to convict upon receiving the signal.
























Figure 3. Optimal persuasion without garbling (left) and with garbling (right)
4 Optimal experimental persuasion
In this section, we describe optimal experimental persuasion with and without gar-
bling.
4.1 No garbling
With no garbling, Sender maximizes her utility function V over the set Π of feasible
experiments. The feasible set Π is not assumed to have any special structure (besides
closedness), so we cannot hope to obtain a sharp characterization of the optimum.
As a running example, consider the binary environment from Section 3, now with
the feasible set Π = {A,A′, B, C,D}. This set is shown in Figure 3 (left) along
with the indifference curves of Sender’s indirect utility function. Experiments B
and C lie below the indifference line, so they do not change Sender’s default action.
Experiments A, A′, and D change Sender’s action after realization s1. The optimal
experiment is A′, which is highlighted in orange in the left panel. Experiment A′
violates both the indifference condition and the certainty condition. The improving
perturbations described in Section 3.3 are not feasible within the set Π.
Experiment A′ is Blackwell dominated by experiment A, yet experiment A′ gives
Sender higher utility. Here, A and A′ have the same value of π1, but experiment A′
would still give higher utility if it were slightly perturbed.
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4.2 With garbling
Figure 3 (right) shows the same primitive set Π = {A,A′, B, C,D} together with the
set ↓Π of feasible synthetic experiments, shaded in gray. The Blackwell undominated
experiments are A, B, and D. The dominated experiments A′ and C do not affect
the set ↓Π. The garbling solution is to perform the primitive experiment A and then
garble the result to generate the synthetic experiment S. In the garbling regime,
there is no loss of generality in removing all Blackwell dominated experiments. Any
garbling of a Blackwell dominated experiment can be replicated by a suitable garbling
of a Blackwell dominating experiment.
Throughout our analysis, the state space is fixed. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011,
p. 2598) explain that the state can be redefined as the outcome of an experiment:
[I]t may seem restrictive to assume that Sender can generate signals that
are arbitrarily informative. This assumption, however, is innocuous under
an appropriate interpretation of the state ω. We can define ω to be the
realization of the most informative signal Sender can generate. Then, his
choice of π is equivalent to a choice of how much to garble information
that is potentially available. [emphasis added]
This redefinition assumes that there exists a most informative experiment. Of course,
if all the feasible experiments can be performed simultaneously, then there is neces-
sarily a most informative (compound) experiment. But as long as there is some
constraint on Sender’s time or resources, there will likely be multiple Blackwell un-
dominated experiments.9
Without a most informative experiment, Sender’s domain of optimization is not
necessarily convex, as is clear in Figure 3 (right). The next result gives an essential
equivalence in the 2 by 2 setting. (Beyond the 2 by 2 setting, there is no canonical way
to order the signal realizations, so mixtures of experiments are difficult to interpret.)
Theorem 2 (Convexity)
Suppose I = J = 2. If the set Π has a most informative experiment, then ↓Π is
convex. If the set Π does not have a most informative experiment and Π is finite,
then ↓Π is not convex.
9An alternative approach would be to define a sequence of auxiliary persuasion problems, one for
each Blackwell undominated experiment. We could solve each problem separately and then compare
the values of the solutions. This approach becomes unwieldy if the Blackwell frontier has many
experiments, and it would not provide graphical intuition for the main persuasion problem.
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Proof. First, suppose that Π has a most informative experiment π̂. Then ↓Π = ↓ π̂.
This set is convex because the space of garbling matrices is convex. (This direction
of the theorem holds for arbitrary I and J .)
For the converse, suppose I = J = 2. Suppose that Π is finite and Π does not have
a most informative experiment. Then there exist two experiments π and π′ that are
Blackwell undominated and Blackwell incomparable. Consider the open line segment
(π, π′) connecting π and π′. We claim that ↓ π ∩ (π, π′) and ↓ π′ ∩ (π, π′) are both
empty.
Now we complete the proof, assuming the claim. We have
(π, π′) ∩ ↓Π =
⋃
π′′∈Π




[π, π′] ∩ ↓ π′′,
where the second equality follows from the claim. The right side is a closed set, being
a finite union of closed sets, so it cannot equal (π, π′). Therefore, ↓Π is not convex.
Now we prove the claim. By symmetry, it suffices to prove that ↓ π ∩ (π, π′)
is empty. Suppose for a contradiction that there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that π 
λπ + (1− λ)π′. It is clear geometrically (and straightforward to check algebraically)
that in the 2 by 2 setting, we have π  ψ if and only if ψ can be expressed as a convex
combination of the three experiments 0 = (0, 0), 1 = (1, 1), and π. Therefore, there
exist nonegative α and β with α + β ≤ 1 such that
λπ + (1− λ)π′ = α0 + β1 + (1− α− β)π.








1− α− β − λ
1− λ
π. (7)
The coefficients on the right side sum to 1, but we must check that they are nonneg-
ative. By our signal-labeling convention, π′1 ≥ π′0 and π1 ≥ π0. Since π′ and π are
undominated, both inequalities must be strict. Therefore, the last coefficient in (7)
must be positive, and we conclude that π  π′, which is a contradiction.
To understand the structure of optimal persuasion with garbling, we seek necessary
conditions for optimality. We could observe that the optimum is the solution to an
auxiliary BP problem in which the state is redefined as the realization of a particular
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primitive experiment. But then the hypotheses and conclusions would be stated
in terms of the redefined state space. The interpretation would depend on which
primitive experiment was performed to achieve the optimal synthetic experiment.
Instead, we provide a different result in terms of the true state space.
To state the characterization result, we need a few definitions. Sender’s ordinal
preferences are state-independent if for all actions a and a′ and states ω and ω′, we
have
v(a, ω) ≥ v(a′, ω) ⇐⇒ v(a, ω′) ≥ v(a′, ω′).
If Sender’s ordinal preferences are state-independent, then we can refer to better and
worse actions for Sender, without reference to the state. Receiver’s default action is
his action â(p) at the prior p. An action a is induced by an experiment π if there
exists j with q̄j(π) > 0 such that â(qj(π)) = a.
Theorem 3 (Indifference condition)
Suppose that Sender’s ordinal preferences are state-independent and that Receiver
does not take a best action by default. Under experimental persuasion with garbling,
after each signal realization, Receiver either (i) takes the worst action among all the
induced actions, or (ii) is indifferent between multiple actions.
Proof. Let π in ↓ Π be an optimal experiment in the garbling regime. Write π = π̄G
for some primitive experiment π̄ in Π and some garbling matrix G. To simplify
notation, write aj = â(qj(π)) for each j.
Suppose for a contradiction that for some j with q̄j(π) > 0, action aj is not
the worst among the induced actions and Receiver is not indifferent between mul-
tiple actions after signal sj. Then there exists j′ with q̄j′(π) > 0 such that Sender
strictly prefers aj to aj′ . Fix ε in (0, 1) and consider the garbling matrix G′ =
id +ε(ej′j − ej′j′).10 Set π′ = πG′ = π̄(GG′). Since GG′ is a garbling matrix, we
know π′ is in ↓ π. For all ε sufficiently small, this modification leaves the Receiver’s
best response unchanged, and shifts positive probability from action aj′ to action aj,
strictly increasing Sender’s utility, contrary to the optimality of π.
If no signal realization from any experiment in Π makes Receiver indifferent be-
tween multiple actions, then Theorem 3 implies that optimal persuasion must involve
nontrivial garbling.












Figure 4. Pareto frontier in BP (orange) and EP (blue)
The conditions of Theorem 3 hold in the leading binary example of the prosecutor
and the judge. Therefore, under optimal persuasion Receiver must be indifferent
when he convicts the defendant. By contrast, the certainty condition does not hold,
as can be seen in Figure 3. Whenever Receiver acquits, however, he is certain of the
realization of the primitive experiment.
5 Concluding discussion
We conclude with a few applications that we can analyze because of our focus on
experiments.
5.1 Welfare
We discuss the welfare implications of our analysis in the leading binary example.
When the state is ω1 (guilty), both Sender and Receiver prefer a1 (convict), so there
is no conflict of interest. When the state is ω0 (innocent), Sender prefers a1 (convict)
and Receiver prefers a0 (acquit). The social planner’s preferred action in this state is
determined by which player gets a higher Pareto weight.
Figure 4 shows the Pareto frontier in two different settings. Under BP, when
all experiments are available, the Pareto frontier is the orange segment connecting












Figure 5. Sender’s indifference curves for costly experiments (left) and frequentist decisions
(right).
the Pareto frontier, action a1 is taken in state ω1. Sender prefers the BP optimum;
Receiver prefers the fully informative experiment. If a social planner maximizes a
social welfare function, then the optimum will be (i) full disclosure if Receiver gets
more weight; (ii) the BP optimum if Sender gets more weight; and (iii) the entire
Pareto frontier if the two players get the same weight.
Next, consider experimental persuasion (EP) with garbling when there are two
primitive experiments, A and B. The Pareto frontier for this regime is shaded in
blue. It consists of two different line segments. One segment consists of garblings
of B. The other segment consists of garblings of A and it contains the optimum
EP. The EP optimum is second-best efficient, but it is not first-best efficient because
πEP1 < 1. Here we see a potential pitfall of redefining the state—it can obscure what
would be feasible if more experiments became available.
5.2 More general preferences
The key object of our analysis is Sender’s indirect utility function over experiments.
We have assumed that Sender’s utility depends only on Receiver’s action choices, and
that Receiver selects his actions by performing Bayesian updating. But our approach
allows for much more general preferences, as long as we can compute the indirect
utility function V . In order to focus on alternative preference structures, we assume
in this section that all experiments are feasible.
First, suppose that experiments are costly. Figure 5 (left) shows Sender’s indif-
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ference curves if each experiment π entails a mutual information cost
c(π) = 3[H(p)− EH(q(π))].
See footnote 8 for the definition of entropy. In this case, we define a new indirect (net)
utility function V ′ = V − c. For simplicity, we plot the indifference curves only for
experiments that change Receiver’s default action. Among experiments that do not
change Receiver’s default action, a completely uninformative experiment is optimal
since it minimizes the cost function c. Sender’s net utility is increasing towards the
southeast. The optimal experiment is indicated by the orange circle. This experiment
satisfies the indifference condition, but it is less costly than the BP solution.
Alternatively, consider a frequentist Receiver. This assumption captures the pro-
cess of drug approval. Sender is a pharmaceutical company and Receiver is the FDA.
The states are ω0 (ineffective drug) and ω1 (effective drug), and the actions are a0
(reject) and a1 (approve). An experiment (clinical trial) is defined by its significance
π0 and power π1. In this case, it is more convenient to relabel the signal realizations
so that π0 ≤ 1/2. This way, the set of experiments is represented as the left half
of the unit square.11 The FDA’s policy for regulating clinical trials is based only on
significance, not power (Isakov et al., 2019). Pharmaceutical companies want their
drugs to be approved and understand this FDA policy. Moreover, they have flexibil-
ity in designing the experiment, through the sample size or stopping criterion (Schulz
and Grimes, 2005).
Figure 5 (right) shows Sender’s indirect utility function in this setting. The vertical
line is given by π0 = α, where α is the FDA’s significance threshold. An experiment
π with π0 > α will not be considered for approval, so the region to the right of
this vertical line is a thick indifference set. Experiments left of this vertical line will
be considered for approval. Sender’s payoff is the ex ante probability that the null
of ineffectiveness is rejected. The indifference curves are parallel lines, with utility
increasing to the northeast. The optimal experiment for Sender is (α, 1), indicated
by the circle.
Compare Sender’s indifference curves for a non-Bayesian FDA in Figure 5 (right)
with Sender’s indifference curves with a Bayesian receiver in Figure 2 (left). Since
11Sender’s utility is still defined for the entire unit square, but much of the square is redundant,
provided that Receiver’s decision rule is invariant to relabeling the signal realizations. It suffices to
plot Sender’s preferences over a subset S of [0, 1] with the property that [0, 1] = S ∪ (1− S).
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Sender is Bayesian in both cases, her preferences are piecewise linear. For all exper-
iments on a fixed line through the origin, a Bayesian receiver must take the same
action after seeing s1. This property can fail for a frequentist receiver. In Figure 5,
for example, every line through the origin will cross the significance threshold.
The tension between frequentist and Bayesian approaches to drug approval has
spawned a heated policy debate. Isakov et al. (2019) argue that different diseases
and therapies require different trade-offs between type-I and type-II error. The FDA
does have some leeway to incorporate these considerations. Recently, the FDA offered
“accelerated approval” to Biogen’s Alzheimer’s drug Aduhelm, despite weak clinical
evidence, because of the severity of Alzheimer’s and the absence of alternative treat-
ments (Belluck and Robbins, 2021). Our results can shed light on this debate by
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A Proof of Theorem 1
First we prove that V is upper semicontinuous. Denote the mixed extension of v to












The belief qj(π) is defined only if q̄j(π) 6= 0, but the terms with q̄j(π) = 0 vanish
anyway, so we can formally define the summation over realizations sj with q̄j(π) 6= 0.
The functions (a, q) 7→ v(a, q) and (a, q) 7→ u(a, q) are both continuous. By Berge’s
theorem, the correspondence q 7→ a∗(q) is upper hemicontinuous, and hence the
function q 7→ maxa∈a∗(q) v(a, q) is upper semicontinuous. Fix π such that q̄j(π) > 0 for
all j. Since the map π 7→ qj(π) is continuous, the entire sum is upper semicontinuous
at π. To complete the proof, observe that if q̄j(π) = 0 for some j, then we can restrict
the summation to those j for which q̄j(π) is positive and repeat the argument. For
any sequence πn converging to π, the contribution of the excluded terms converges
to 0 in the limit (since v is bounded).
The set Π0 of all experiments is compact, so it suffices to check that the feasible
set is closed. In the no-garbling regime, this is immediate by assumption. For the
garbling regime, it remains to check that ↓Π is also closed. Consider a sequence of
experiments πn in ↓Π that converges to some experiment π in Π0. For each n, write
πn = π̄nGn for some π̄n in Π and some garbling matrix Gn. Since Π and the space
of garblings are both compact, we can find a convergent subsequence (π̄nk , Gnk) of




Hence π is in ↓Π.
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